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vision that the best way to avoid war
was through strength and readiness, as
reflected in SAC’s motto: “Peace Is Our
Profession.” LeMay felt he was one of
the few people who understood that the
United States was at war with the Soviet
Union and that the only way SAC could
provide the security that the nation
needed was to be prepared to go to nuclear war at a moment’s notice. Everything he did was focused on that
objective.
After relinquishing command at SAC,
LeMay served as the U.S. Air Force’s
vice chief of staff and then chief of staff
during the Dwight D. Eisenhower, John
F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations. In the later years, LeMay
worked for Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, who, ironically, had once
worked for LeMay as a targeting analyst. The relationship between these two
men was often confrontational, but despite their differences McNamara called
LeMay “the finest military strategist this
nation ever produced.”
The last major chapter in LeMay’s life is
the one probably best remembered and
yet least reflective of LeMay’s internal
values. LeMay’s decision to run for vice
president on the Independent ticket
with Alabama’s Governor George
Wallace confounded everyone, including his own wife, daughter, and closest
associates. Kozak maintains there is no
evidence of LeMay being a racist and
maintains that the only reason he chose
to run was to split the vote, ensuring
that Democratic presidential candidate,
Hubert Humphrey, would not win the
election and so continue the policies of
the Johnson administration. By running, LeMay believed, he was taking
“one last chance to rise up and do battle” against the “defense intellectuals,”

whom he believed would cut the U.S.
deterrent until the Soviets could win a
general war.
This book’s greatest value might be that
it offers an opportunity to consider objectively the impact that Curtis E.
LeMay (the youngest general in modern
American history and its longest serving) had on the events that shaped this
nation for many years to come.
ROGER DUCEY

Naval War College

Willmott, H. P. The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books, 2008. 520pp. $17.60

The Great Crusade is a comprehensive
military history of World War II. With a
focus on strategic-level military operations and a global perspective, this work
provides a particularly complete and nationally balanced account of the war. H.
P. Willmott achieves his ambitious goal
of providing “a basic reference and guide
to the war” that offers balance among
the major fronts of the conflict and illuminates “why events unfolded in the
manner in which they did.”
The Great Crusade discusses conflict
between countries and systems, not
between leaders or equipment. It is
about “how states make war and the basis on which services planned, executed
and either won or lost campaigns.”
Willmott distinguishes between the use
of available forces by military commanders to win campaigns and the use
of national power to win wars. National
and international political factors, beginning in 1931, get the attention they
deserve. How and why countries joined
and left the conflict (including the
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lesser Axis members) is presented in
context but without excess sympathy.
The ideology and associated atrocities
of Germany and Japan strengthened
morale at home and intimidated some,
but brutality prevented any prospect of
willing economic or military support
from conquered areas, particularly
China and the non-Russian parts of the
Soviet Union. The failure of the German and Japanese governments to mobilize their economies effectively when
at war contrasts with efforts by the key
Allied powers.
Willmott argues convincingly against numerous popular ideas concerning the war.
He attacks the “myth of German military
excellence,” offering numerous examples
of error and failure in military efforts and
in related economic and political activities. He highlights the paramount importance of the Russian front, covering the
enormous scale of combat and the tremendous improvement in Soviet military
strategic and operational skill.
This work is rich with comparisons between campaigns, strategies, and countries, and it covers land, sea, and air
operations with good balance. Numerous statistics illustrate key ideas and
strengthen the historical narrative. Dozens of maps help illustrate key campaigns. Also, the general index is useful.
Corrections to page numbers in the
“Campaign Index” planned for the second printing will make this book invaluable. The bibliography organizes
suggestions into fourteen categories
that reflect regions or themes in a way
that may compensate for the absence of
citations.
Willmott’s impressive credentials include faculty experience at several universities and at the Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst. He has written
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nineteen books and coauthored several
others. He is a fellow of the Royal
Historical Society.
Because this work is “a general overview
of military events” with some emphasis
on correcting popular misunderstandings, it offers a great deal to readers at
every level of expertise. This sweeping
history provides the reader with great
insights into World War II in particular
but also into enduring issues, including
relationships between military,
political, and economic power.
BRENT BOSTON

Commander, U.S. Navy

Barritt, M. K. Eyes of the Admiralty: J. T. Serres—
an Artist in the Channel Fleet, 1799–1800. London: Hydrographic Office and National Maritime Museum, 2008. 144pp. $39.95

For centuries, the port of Brest in
northwestern France has been the chief
naval base and dockyard for French naval operations in the North Atlantic and
the Channel. For Britain, during the
Napoleonic Wars—as well as in all the
maritime wars between Britain and
France in 1689 and 1815—the French
Brest squadron was a central threat to
the Royal Navy. British naval strategy to
counter this threat had a number of elements. The Royal Navy’s Channel
Squadron had, as a primary duty, the
blockade of Brest. These operations
served the strategic function of deterring the Brest squadron from leaving
port and, thereby, of preventing it from
launching an invasion force against
Britain or its overseas possessions, attacking the British fleet, or interfering
with British warships and merchant
convoys that were using the nearby
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